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 Probability, Confirmation, and the Conjunction Fallacy 
 
 
 
Abstract. The “conjunction fallacy” has been a key topic in discussions and debates 
on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Yet the attempt of providing a 
satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proven challenging. Here we propose a 
new analysis. We suggest that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious 
probability judgments experimentally observed are typically guided by sound 
assessments of confirmation relations, meant in terms of contemporary Bayesian 
confirmation theory. The proposed analysis is shown robust (i.e., not depending on 
various alternative ways of measuring degrees of confirmation), consistent with 
available data, and prompting further empirical investigations. The present approach 
emphasizes the relevance of the notion of confirmation in the assessments of the 
relationships between the normative and descriptive study of inductive reasoning.   
 
 
Introduction: probability and confirmation in inductive logic 
Inductive logic may be seen as the study of how a piece of evidence e affects the 
credibility of a hypothesis h. Within contemporary epistemology, a major perspective 
on this issue is provided by Bayesianism. Early Bayesian theorists, such as Carnap 
(1950), proposed the conditional probability of h on e as an explicatum of the basic 
inductive-logical relationship between evidence and hypothesis. This account, however, 
led to counterintuitive consequences and conceptual contradictions, emphasized in a 
now classical debate (see Popper, 1954). Later on, Carnap himself came to a 
fundamental distinction between the notions of firmness and increase in firmness of a 
hypothesis h in the light of a piece of evidence e, and reached the conclusion that the 
posterior of h could be taken as accounting for the former concept, but not the latter 
(Carnap, 1962). In fact, the credibility of a hypothesis (e.g., a diagnosis) may increase 
as an effect of evidence e (e.g., a positive result in a diagnostic test) and still remain 
relatively low (for instance, because the concerned disease is very rare); similarly, e 
might reduce the credibility of h while leaving it rather high. As simple as it is, this 
distinction is of the utmost importance for contemporary Bayesianism. 
Epistemologists and inductive logicians working in the Bayesian framework have 
proposed a plurality of models to formalize and quantify the notion of confirmation, 
meant in terms of Carnap’s increase in firmness brought by e to h (or, equivalently, as 
the inductive strength of the argument from e to h). Each proposal maps a pair of 
statements e,h on a real number which is positive in case p(h|e) > p(h) (i.e., when e 
confirms h), equals 0 in case p(h|e) = p(h) (i.e., when e is neutral for h), and is negative 
otherwise (i.e., when e disconfirms h). Table 1 reports a representative sample of 
alternative Bayesian measures of confirmation discussed in the literature (see Festa, 
1999; Fitelson, 1999): 
Table 1. Alternative Bayesian measures of confirmation.  
 D(h,e) = p(h|e) – p(h)        (Carnap, 1950; Eells, 1982) 
 R(h,e) = ln[p(h|e)/p(h)]     (Keynes, 1921) 
 L(h,e) = ln[p(e|h)/p(e|¬h)]      (Good, 1950; Fitelson, 2001) 
 C(h,e) = p(h&e) – p(h)  p(e)     (Carnap, 1950) 
 S(h,e) = p(h|e) – p(h|¬e)               (Christensen, 1999; Joyce, 1999) 
 
                 (Crupi, Tentori, & Gonzalez, 2007) 
   
 
It is well known that p(h|e) and c(h,e) – where c stands for any of the Bayesian 
measures of confirmation listed above – exhibit remarkably different properties. One 
such difference will play a crucial role in what follows. It amounts to the following fact: 
(1) h1 |= h2 implies p(h1|e)  p(h2|e) but does not imply c(h1,e)  c(h2,e) 
To illustrate, consider the random extraction of a card from a standard deck, and let e, 
h1 and h2 be statements concerning the drawn card, as follows:  
e = “black” 
h1 = “face of spades” 
h2 = “face” 
Notice that, clearly, h1 |= h2, so the probability of the former cannot exceed that of the 
latter, even conditionally on e. In fact, by the standard probability calculus, p(h1|e) = 
3/26 < 6/26 = p(h2|e). However, the reader will concur that knowing e positively affects 
the credibility of h1 while leaving that of h2 entirely unchanged, so that c(h1,e) > c(h2,e). 
This is because p(h1|e) = 3/26 > 3/52 = p(h1), whereas p(h2|e) = 6/26 = 12/52 = p(h2). 
Examples such as this one effectively highlight the crucial conceptual distinction 
between probability and confirmation.  
 
Probability and confirmation in the psychology of induction 
The consideration of normative models of reasoning is often relevant in interpreting 
empirical studies of human cognition. In a touchstone work in the psychology of 
inductive reasoning with statements involving familiar biological categories (such as 
“mice”) and “blank” biological predicates (such as “use serotonin as a 
neurotransmitter”), Osherson et al. (1990) presented participants with a pair of 
arguments of the following form (where the statements above and below the bar serve 
as premise and conclusion, respectively):  
(e) robins have property P 
      ---------------------------- 
(h1) all birds have property P 
 (e) robins have property P 
      ---------------------------- 
(h2) ostriches have property P 
When asked to “choose the argument whose facts provide a better reason for believing 
its conclusion”, a robust majority (65%) chose argument e,h1. Notice that these 
instructions may be legitimately interpreted as eliciting an (ordinal) judgment of 
confirmation, i.e., in our terms, a ranking of c(h1,e) and c(h2,e). Argument e,h1, 
however, also scored a significantly higher rating when subjects in a different group 
were asked to “estimate the probability of each conclusion on the assumption that the 
respective premises were true”, i.e., p(h1|e) and p(h2|e). Osherson et al. (1990) 
convincingly argue that these results are connected to the fact that robins are perceived 
as highly typical birds while ostriches are not.  
The former results are commonly labelled a “fallacy” in the psychological literature on 
inductive reasoning, on the basis that h1 |= h2 (see, for instance: Gentner & Medina, 
1998, p. 283; Heit, 2000, p. 574; Sloman & Lagnado, 2004, p. 105). Indeed, a fallacy is 
certainly there when the posteriors of h1 and h2, respectively, are at issue. It is not 
necessarily so, however, if the two arguments are assessed by their inductive strength, 
i.e., in terms of confirmation. In fact, assume c(h1,e) > c(h2,e). This will impose some 
constraints on probability assignments to e, h1, and h2. Such constraints will in fact 
differ depending on what c is, i.e., either one or the other of the Bayesian measures of 
confirmation listed above. However, it can be shown that there exist consistent 
probability assignments which simultaneously satisfy the constraints imposed by all the 
confirmation measures listed above (meaning that this demonstration yields a robust 
result in the sense of Fitelson, 1999). To see this, it suffices to apply a method of 
analysis of categorical arguments proposed by Heit (1998) and consider the probability 
assignments reported in Table 2. 
Table 2. Possible probability assignments concerning e (“robins have property 
P”), h1 (“all birds have property P”) and h2 (“ostriches have property P”). 
conjunction n.  p(ci) p(e|ci) p(ci|e) 
1 e & h1 .20 1 .57 
2 e & ¬h1 .15 1 .43 
3 ¬e & h1 0 0 0 
4 ¬e & ¬h1 .65 0 0 
5 e & h2 .22 1 .63 
6 e & ¬h2 .13 1 .37 
7 ¬e & h2 .13 0 0 
8 ¬e & ¬h2 .52 0 0 
The table does not contain any inconsistency and has been built to convey the 
following statements: 
• p(e) = p(h2), since P is a “blank” predicate 
• p(h1) < p(h2), since the former implies the latter 
• p(e&h1) < p(e&h2), since the former implies the latter (not the converse), but the 
difference between the two is minor, for robins are highly typical birds but ostriches 
are not, therefore the properties shared by robins and ostriches are virtually only 
those shared by robins and birds. 
By the values in Table 2, it can be computed that p(h1) = .2, p(h2) = .35, p(h1|e) = .57 
and p(h2|e) = .63. On this conditions, it is easy to show that, for any of the measures of 
confirmation in Table 1, c(h1,e) > c(h2,e), which reflects precisely the ranking exhibited 
by experimental subjects’ responses. (Computational details omitted.) Importantly, this 
result does not depend on a selective choice of the value of priors such as p(h1), since a 
similar table may be construed wherein, for instance, p(h1) = .5. Thus, a Bayesian 
account of confirmation may in fact imply the observed ranking of inductive strength 
under plausible assumptions. The foregoing analysis suggests a charitable reading of the 
participants’ responses: possibly, even when judging posterior probabilities, people’s 
evaluations were guided by assessments of the degree of confirmation provided by e to 
h1 and h2, respectively.  
In what follows, the working hypothesis that, in certain circumstances, reported 
assessments of probability may reflect the appreciation of confirmation relations will be 
applied to one of the most widely known and discussed phenomenon in the study of 
human reasoning, i.e., the “conjunction fallacy”. 
 
The conjunction fallacy: Linda, the ill and Bjorn Borg 
A number of studies have established that, in the presence of some available evidence 
(e), people may judge a conjunction of hypotheses (h1&h2) as more probable than one of 
its conjuncts, contrary to the elementary principle of probability known as the 
“conjunction rule”. Three examples taken by the seminal work of Tversky & Kahneman 
(1983) will serve as illustration for our purposes.  
• When faced with the description of a character, Linda, 31 years old, single, 
outspoken and very bright, with a major in philosophy, concerns about discrimination 
and social justice and an involvement in anti-nuclear demonstrations (e), most people 
ranked “Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement” (h1&h2) as more 
probable than “Linda is a bank teller” (h1).  
• Given the description of the clinical case of a 55-old woman with a pulmonary 
embolism documented angiographically 10 days after a cholecystectomy (e), a large 
majority of physicians judged that the patient would more likely experience emiparesis 
and dyspnea (h1&h2) than emiparesis (h1). 
• Asked soon after Borg’s victory of his fifth consecutive Wimbledon in 1980 (e) 
(when, as Tversky & Kahneman remarked, “Borg seemed extremely strong”, p. 31), the 
majority of participants predicted that, having reached the final in the 1981 edition, 
Borg would have more probably lost the first set but won the match (h1&h2) than lost 
the first set (h1). 
The “conjunction fallacy” has become a key topic in discussions and debates on the 
rationality of human reasoning and its limitations (see Stich, 1990, Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1996, and Gigerenzer, 1996, among others). For this reason, considerable 
attention has been devoted to the conditions which may increase conformity to the 
conjunction rule (see, for instance, Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999, and Mellers, Hertwig, 
& Kahneman, 2001). Despite extensive inquiry, however, the available empirical results 
have not found a fully satisfactory explanation.  
A reading of the conjuntion fallacy effect has been proposed within support theory 
(Tversky & Koehler, 1994; Brenner, Koehler, & Rottenstreich, 2002). Support theory is 
a formal framework departing from classical probability theory and devised as a 
descriptive account of subjective probability assessments. It models subjective 
probability as depending on a newly introduced psychological construct which is 
labelled the support associated with a given hypothesis and is informally interpreted as 
“the strength of evidence in favor of this hypothesis “ (Tversky & Koehler, 1994, p. 
445). From the formal properties of the support function, a critical (non-normative) 
tenet of the theory is derived (also labelled unpacking principle), i.e., the subaddivity of 
the judged probability of a hypothesis h with regards to the judged probabilities of a set 
of mutually exclusive hypotheses whose disjuntion is logically equivalent to h. The 
relevant instantiation of this statement would amount to the following disequality: 
(2) p(h1|e)  p(h1&h2|e) + p(h1&¬h2|e) 
Expression (2) says, for instance, that, given Linda’s character, the judged probability 
of her being a bank teller may be lower than the judged probability of her being a 
feminist bank teller plus the judged probability of her being a non-feminist bank teller. 
(2) is inconsistent with the conjunction rule and compatible with violations thereof. 
However, the conjunction fallacy reflects a significantly more extreme pattern than 
simple subadditivity, i.e.: 
(3) p(h1|e) < p(h1&h2|e) 
To the best of our knowledge, although consistent with pattern (3), support theory 
does not provide grounds to predict its occurrence under independently specified 
conditions. Similar difficulties arise with other algebraic models which, although 
consistent with the conjunction fallacy effect, can account for the phenomenon only by 
letting quite a few free parameters to be determined from the data to be explained (see, 
for instance, Birnbaum, Anderson, & Hynan, 1990; and Massaro, 1994).   
A more empirically grounded approach has been taken by Shafir, Smith, & Osherson 
(1990), elaborating on Tversky and Kahneman’s original hypothesis of the 
“representativeness heuristic”. The authors of this study have collected “typicality 
ratings” of Linda’s character relative to the single category “bank teller” and the 
conjoint category “feminist bank teller” and interpreted such ratings as reflecting 
intuitive assessments of the likelihood of e given h1 and h1&h2, respectively. In Linda’s 
problem, and in a set of similar cases, such typicality ratings have proven reliable 
predictors of the conjunction fallacy effect. However, the explanatory hypothesis of 
people’s assessment of posteriors p(h1|e) and p(h1&h2|e) by an evaluation of the 
likelihoods p(e|h1) and p(e|h1&h2) is not easily extended to the medical or the Borg 
cases above. In fact, this would imply the rather cumbersome judgmental strategy of 
focussing on the probability of the given clinical frame and Borg’s past record, 
respectively, given future (hypothetical) events such as the manifestation of certain 
symptoms or the outcome of a match.
1
   
 A confirmation-theoretical analysis 
The examples reported in the previous section represent a whole class of findings 
about conjunction problems sharing a distinctive set of common traits: 
(i) e is negatively (if at all) correlated with h1; 
(ii) e is positively correlated with h2, even conditionally on h1; 
(iii) h1 and h2 are mildly (if at all) negatively correlated. 
As we have seen, even in the limited class of examples satisfying conditions (i)-(iii), 
the attempt of providing a unifying account of the experimental results has proven 
challenging.
2
 The conjecture proposed here is that such an account could be found on 
the basis of the notion of confirmation; subjects, while asked about probabilities, may in 
fact have a tendency to evaluate confirmation. More precisely, the hypothesis is that, on 
conditions (i)-(iii), most subjects may depart from the relevant probabilistic relationship 
between p(h1&h2|e) and p(h1|e) because of the perception that c(h1&h2,e) > c(h1,e).
 
It should be noticed that Sides et al. (2001) already gave this hypothesis some 
attention. In our view, however, although important, their treatment has the limitation of 
being measure-dependent, i.e., not robust. (The problem of measure-dependence and the 
importance of robustness are discussed in Fitelson, 1999.) In fact, the analysis presented 
in Sides et al. (2001) only refers to the “ratio measure” (measure R in Table 1). This is 
particularly problematic for the adequacy of that very confirmation measure has been 
found questionable on both normative and empirical grounds (see Crupi, Tentori, & 
Gonzalez, 2007; Eells & Fitelson, 2002; and Tentori et al., 2006).  
The present analysis is centered on the following theorem (see the Appendix for a 
proof), which removes the foregoing limitation by showing that, for any choice among 
major alternative confirmation measures, appropriate confirmation- theoretic renditions 
of (i) and (ii) are sufficiente to imply the ordering c(h1&h2,e) > c(h1,e):  
Theorem. For any Bayesian measure of confirmation c among D, R, L, C, S and Z,  
if    (i) c(h1,e)  0  
and (ii) c(h2,e|h1) > 0,  
then c(h1&h2,e) > c(h1,e).
3 
Psychologically, a plurality of plausible cognitive processes may converge on the 
judgment that c(h1&h2,e) > c(h1,e). First of all, notice that the appreciation of e’s 
fostering the credibility of h2 but not h1 (i.e., e’s confirming the former but not the 
latter) seems entirely straightforward in standard conjunction problems such as Linda, 
the ill and Borg. Given that, people’s judgment about the effect of e on h1&h2 may 
reflect the estimation of an average (either weighted or simple) of the (positive) 
perceived strength of argument e,h2 and the (negative or null) perceived strength of 
e,h1.
4
 Also, variants of an “anchoring and adjustment” process (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974), by which the perceived strength of one of the arguments is subsequently adjusted 
towards the other, would produce the same outcome. The point of the present analysis is 
that the result of such a line of thought, while incoherent as a probability ranking (and, 
thus, a genuine error given the intended meaning of the experimental task), is perfectly 
sound on a confirmation-theoretic reading. In fact, the present analysis fleshes out and 
extends the otherwise esoteric remark by Tversky and Kahneman themselves that 
“feminist bank teller is a better hypothesis about Linda than bank teller” (1983, p. 45). It  
is, we submit, because it is better confirmed by Linda’s description. And the same 
occurs with the other examples discussed.  
Notably, this reading of the conjunction fallacy already bears some new empirically 
testable predictions. First, it predicts that, in the kind of conjunction problems which we 
have been considering (i.e., satisfying conditions (i)-(iii)), explicitly elicited 
assessments of c(h1&h2,e) and c(h1,e) should mirror the observed responses when 
evaluation of p(h1&h2|e) and p(h1|e) are requested. Second, it implies a correlation 
between the difference in the perceived strength of arguments e,h2 and e,h1 and the 
entity of the conjunction fallacy effect in standard probabilistic tasks concerning h1&h2 
and h1 in the presence of e.  
 
Conclusive remarks 
Noticing that a perfectly Bayesian agent would never entertain inconsistent 
probabilities, one might find odd that the notion of Bayesian confirmation be invoked to 
account for a probabilistic fallacy. We do not think, however, that this concern is well-
grounded. Indeed, we suspect that it rests on the misunderstanding of an alleged 
“supervenience” of the notion of confirmation on that of probability.  
There is no question that, as a matter of historical fact, the standard formal treatment 
of probability reached an established form long ago, and thus served as a conceptual 
basis for theories of confirmation. Formally, however, the relationship between the two 
notions is rather symmetric: simply, they mathematically constraint each other. From an 
empirical point of view, moreover, there is evidence that intuitive assessments of 
confirmation can be elicited directly, that – at least in some contexts – people can 
appropriately distinguish probability and confirmation and that their judgments satisfy, 
to a significant extent, the formal relationships between the two notions (see Tentori, 
Crupi, Bonini, & Osherson, 2006; Tentori, Crupi, & Osherson, 2007).  
The conjunction fallacy may be seen as a case of content prevailing over form. We 
suggest that, in most standard conjunction experimental problems, content favors the 
assessment of confirmation-theoretic relationships among e, h1 and h2 to the detriment 
of the appreciation that, whatever h1 and h2 may be, any state satisfying h1 also satisfies 
h1&h2. In such conditions, “the answer to a question [probability] can be biased by the 
availability of an answer to a cognate question [confirmation]” (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983, p. 47, square brackets added).  
The notion of confirmation has proven an important conceptual tool in the normative 
analysis of inductive reasoning. In our opinion, the same could obtain in the descriptive 
study of such kind of reasoning (where it has not attracted comparable attention), and in 
the assessment of the relationships between the two.  
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Notes 
1. An interesting reading of Linda’s case has been given by Bovens & Hartmann (2003, pp. 85-88) in 
terms of the reliability of sources of information. However, this is also not easily extended to 
conjunction problems involving future events. 
2. As examples of conjunction problems not satisfying conditions (i)-(iii) see those investigated by 
Tentori, Bonini, & Osherson (2004). Although suspecting that the consideration of appropriate 
confirmation-theoretic relations may account for such cases as well, we leave a detailed analysis 
thereof out of the scope of the present work.  
3. The conditional confirmation condition (ii) c(h2,e|h1) > 0 is equivalent, in probabilistic terms, to 
p(e|h1&h2) > p(e|h1). The proof provided in the Appendix exploits the fact that the antecedent of the 
Theorem implies precisely p(e|h1&h2) > p(e|h1) along with p(e|¬(h1&h2)) < p(e|¬h1), which in turn 
imply c(h1&h2,e) > c(h1,e). The latter implication is an instantiation of the so-called “weak law of 
likelihood”, which holds for any Bayesian confirmation measure c, as already noticed by Joyce (2004) 
and Fitelson (2006).  
4. Averaging models of the conjunction fallacy have been successfully tested by Fantino et al. (1997). 
Their results are thus consistent with the hypothesis proposed here, on the assumption that probability 
ratings reflect intuitive assessments of confirmation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
Birnbaum, M.H., Anderson, C.J., & Hynan, L.G. (1990). Theories of bias in probability judgment. In 
J.P. Caverni, J.M. Fabre, & M. Gonzalez, M. (eds.), Cognitive Biases (pp. 477-499), North Holland; 
Elsevier. 
Bovens, L. & Hartmann, S. (2003). Bayesian epistemology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Brenner, L.A., Koehler, D.J., & Rottenstreich, Y. (2002). Remarks on support theory: Recent advances 
and future directions. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (eds.), Heuristics and biases: The 
psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 489-509). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Carnap, R. (1950). Logical foundations of probability. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Carnap, R. (1962). Preface. In Logical foundations of probability (2
nd
 ed.). Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Christensen, D. (1999). Measuring confirmation. Journal of Philosophy, 96, 437– 461. 
Crupi, V., Tentori, K., & Gonzalez, M. (2007). On Bayesian measures of evidential support: Theoretical 
and empirical issues. Philosophy of Science, forthcoming. 
Eells, E. (1982). Rational decision and causality. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Eells, E. & Fitelson, B. (2002). Symmetries and asymmetries in evidential support. Philosophical 
Studies, 107, 129-142.  
Fantino, E., Kulik, J., Stolarez-Fantino, S., & Wright, W. (1997). The conjunction fallacy: A test of 
averaging hypotheses”. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 4, 96-101.  
Festa, R. (1999). Bayesian confirmation. In M. Galavotti & A. Pagnini (eds.), Experience, reality, and 
scientific explanation (pp. 55-87). Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Fitelson, B. (1999). The plurality of Bayesian measures of confirmation and the problem of measure 
sensitivity. Philosophy of Science, 66, S362–S378. 
Fitelson, B. (2001). A Bayesian account of independent evidence with applications. Philosophy of 
Science, 68, S123-S140. 
Fitelson, B. (2006). Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and relational confirmation”. Synthese, forthcoming. 
Gentner, D. & Medina, J. (1998). Similarity and the development of rules. Cognition, 65, 263-297. 
Gigerenzer, G. (1996). On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A rebuttal to Kahneman and Tversky. 
Psychological Review, 103, 592-596. 
Good, I.J. (1950). Probability and the weighing of evidence. London: Griffin. 
Heit, E. (1998). A Bayesian analysis of some forms of inductive reasoning. In M. Oaksford & N. Chater 
(eds.), Rational models of cognition (pp. 248-274). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Heit, E. (2000). Properties of inductive reasoning. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 7, 569-592. 
Hertwig, R. & Gigerenzer, G. (1999). The “conjunction fallacy” revised: How intelligent inferences 
look like reasoning errors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12, 275-305. 
Joyce, J. (1999). The foundations of causal decision theory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Joyce, J. (2004). Bayes’s theorem. In E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy 
(Summer 2004 Edition), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/bayes-theorem/. 
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1996). On the reality of cognitive illusions. Psychological Review, 103, 
582-591. 
Keynes, J. (1921). A treatise on probability. London: Macmillan. 
Massaro, D.W. (1994). A pattern recognition account of decision making. Memory & Cognition, 22, 
616-627. 
Mellers, A., Hertwig, R., & Kahneman, D. (2001). Do frequency representations eliminate conjunction 
effects? An exercise in adversarial collaboration. Psychological  Science, 12, 269-275. 
Osherson, D.N., Smith, E.E., Wilkie, O., Lopez, A. & Shafir, E. (1990). Category-based induction. 
Psychological Review, 97, 185-200. 
Popper, K.R. (1954). Degree of confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 5, 143-149.  
Sides, A., Osherson, D., Bonini, N., & Viale, R. (2002). On the reality of the conjunction fallacy. 
 Memory & Cognition, 30, 191-198.  
Sloman, S.A. & Lagnado, D. (2005). The problem of induction. In R. Morrison & K. Holyoak (eds.),  
Cambridge handbook of thinking & reasoning (pp. 95-116). New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Stich, S. (1990). The fragmentation of reason: Preface to a pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Tentori, K., Bonini, N., & Osherson, D. (2004). The conjunction fallacy: A misunderstanding about 
conjunction? Cognitive Science, 28, 467-477. 
Tentori, K., Crupi, V., & Osherson, D. (2007). Determinants of confirmation. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, forthcoming. 
Tentori, K., Crupi, V., Bonini, N., & Osherson, D. (2006). Comparison of confirmation measures. 
Cognition, forthcoming. 
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 
1124-1131. 
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional vs. intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in 
probability judgment. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (eds.), Heuristics and biases: The 
psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 19-48). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Tversky, A. & Koehler, D.J. (1994). Support theory: A non-extensional representation of subjective 
probability. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman, (eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of 
intuitive judgment (pp. 441-473). New York: Cambridge University Press.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
Theorem. For any Bayesian measure of confirmation c among D, R, L, C, S and Z,  
if     (i) c(h1,e)  0  
and (ii) c(h2,e|h1) > 0,  
then c(h1&h2,e) > c(h1,e) 
Proof: 
We will prove the theorem by means of the following lemma: 
Lemma. If c(h1,e)  0 and c(h2,e|h1) > 0, then: 
(1) p(e|h1&h2) > p(e|h1) 
(2) p(e|¬(h1&h2)) < p(e|¬h1) 
 Proof.     (1)  c(h2,e|h1) > 0 iff c(e,h2|h1) > 0 iff p(e|h1&h2) > p(e|h1). 
(2)  c(h2,e|h1) > 0 iff c(e,h2|h1) > 0 iff c(e,¬h2|h1) < 0 iff p(e|¬h2&h1) < p(e|h1). Since c(h1,e)  0, we have 
p(e|h1)  p(e|¬h1). Then it follows that p(e|¬h2&h1) < p(e|¬h1), which is logically equivalent to 
p(e|¬(h1&h2)) < p(e|¬h1).  
By the lemma above, we will now prove the theorem considering measures D, R, L, C, S, and Z in turn. Notice that, 
since it is assumed that c(h1,e)  0, it is sufficient to prove the theorem in case c(h1&h2,e)  0 (for otherwise it would 
hold trivially).  
Measure D:  
p(e|h1&h2) > p(e|h1) iff  
p(e|h1&h2)/p(e) > p(e|h1)/p(e) iff  
p(h1&h2|e)/p(h1&h2) > p(h1|e)/p(h1) iff  
[p(h1&h2|e)/p(h1&h2)] – 1 > [p(h1|e)/p(h1)] – 1 iff  
[p(h1&h2|e) – p(h1&h2)]/p(h1&h2) > [p(h1|e) – p(h1)]/p(h1) iff  
[p(h1&h2|e) – p(h1&h2)]  p(h1) > [p(h1|e) – p(h1)]  p(h1&h2), which implies  
p(h1&h2|e) – p(h1&h2) > p(h1|e) – p(h1), i.e.,  
D(h1&h2,e) > D(h1,e) 
Measure R:  
p(e|h1&h2) > p(e|h1) iff  
p(e|h1&h2)/p(e) > p(e|h1)/p(e) iff  
p(h1&h2|e)/p(h1&h2) > p(h1|e)/p(h1) iff  
ln[p(h1&h2|e)/p(h1&h2)] > ln[p(h1|e)/p(h1)], i.e.,  
R(h1&h2,e) > R(h1,e)  
Measure L:  
If p(e|h1&h2) > p(e|h1) and p(e|¬(h1&h2)) < p(e|¬h1), then  
p(e|h1&h2)/p(e|¬(h1&h2)) > p(e|h1)/p(e|¬h1), which implies  
ln[p(e|h1&h2)/p(e|¬(h1&h2))] > ln[p(e|h1)/p(e|¬h1)], i.e.,  
L(h1&h2,e) > L(h1,e)   
Measure C:  
D(h1&h2,e) > D(h1,e) iff  
D(h1&h2,e)  p(e) > D(h1,e)  p(e), i.e.,  
C(h1&h2,e) > C(h1,e) 
Measure S:  
D(h1&h2,e) > D(h1,e) iff  
D(h1&h2,e)/p(¬e) > D(h1,e)/p(¬e), i.e.,  
S(h1&h2,e) > S(h1,e) 
Measure Z:  
p(e|h1&h2) > p(e|h1) iff  
p(e|h1&h2)/p(e) > p(e|h1)/p(e) iff  
p(h1&h2|e)/p(h1&h2) > p(h1|e)/p(h1) iff  
[p(h1&h2|e)/p(h1&h2)] – 1 > [p(h1|e)/p(h1)] – 1 iff  
[p(h1&h2|e) – p(h1&h2)]/p(h1&h2) > [p(h1|e) – p(h1)]/p(h1), i.e.,  
Z(h1&h2,e) > Z(h1,e) 
